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Zuckerman: Double Jeopardy

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
In the Matter of Bairn v. Eidens
(decided January 11, 2001)

Travis Bairn was charged with criminal sale of a controlled
substance, and two counts of criminal possession of a controlled
substance. 2 Bairn was acquitted on the charge of criminal sale, but
the jury was unable to reach a verdict on either possession
offense.3 The trial court accepted the partial verdict.4 Bairn then
commenced an Article 785 proceeding to prohibit a retrial on the
possession offenses. 6 Baim argued that a retrial would violate his
Fifth Amendment 7 constitutional protection against double
jeopardy. In addition, Bairn claimed that a retrial would be
repugnant to Article I, Section 6 of New York's Constitution, 8 as
well as New York's double jeopardy statute, Criminal Procedure
Law Section 40.20. 9 Furthermore, Bairn asserted that a retrial was
precluded by collateral estoppel. 10
'279 A.D.2d 787, 718 N.Y.S.2d 718 (3d Dep't 2001).
2id.

3 Id. at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
4id.

' N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1994) provides in pertinent part:

Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review,
mandamus or prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding under

this article. Wherever in any statute reference is made to a writ or
order of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition,, such reference

shall, so far as applicable, be deemed to refer t.o the proceeding
authorized by this article.
6

Baim, 279 A.D.2d at 788-89, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.

7 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
8 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person shall be
subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
9 Baim, 279 A.D.2d at 788-89, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §
40.20(2) (McKinney 1992) states in pertinent part:

A person may not be separately prosecuted for two offenses
based upon the same act or criminal transaction unless:
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The Appellate Division, Third Department, did not
subscribe to any of Baim's arguments, holding that Baim failed to
show the requisite necessity to resort to the extraordinary remedy
of prohibition of a new trial, and that a conviction of either of the
possession offenses at a retrial would not contradict Baim's
acquittal on the sale offense." Additionally, the Third Department
found that Baim did not meet his burden of showing that the
acquittal of the sale offense at the first trial would "necessarily
decide a particular factual issue" in a new proceeding. 12 Finally,
the Appellate Division concluded that collateral
estoppel did not
3
preclude retrial of the possession offenses.'
The three offenses resulted from a transaction which took
place on January 19, 1999 at the home of Matthew Carter. On that
day, Robert Costello, an informant for the Schenectady Police
14
Department went to Carter's house with $200 to purchase drugs.
David Callahan was also present in Carter's house that day to buy
drugs.' 5 Callahan contacted Baim, who arrived on the scene
sometime later. 16 Upon arrival, Baim conversed with Callahan,
and then allegedly revealed three plastic bags of cocaine., 7 Baim
traded the largest bag of cocaine with Callahan for a piece of
jewelry, and it was Callahan who subsequently cut a portion of that

(a) The offenses as defined have substantially different
elements and the acts establishing one offense are in the main
clearly distinguishable from those establishing the other; or
(b) Each of the offenses as defined contains an element which
is not an element of the other, and the statutory provisions
defining such offenses are designed to prevent very different
kinds of harm or evil; or
(c) One of such offenses consists of criminal possession of
contraband matter and the other offense is one involving the
use of such contraband matter, other than a sale thereof.
10Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
ll

Id.

Id. at 789-90, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (quoting People v. Acevedo, 69
N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987)).
13Id. at 790, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
12

14

Id.

11 Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 787, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
16
id.
17Id.
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cocaine for Costello. 18 Costello gave a written statement to police
naming Baim as the seller of cocaine, but his testimony at trial
contradicted his written statement.' 9
At trial, Costello
unequivocally testified that the drugs he bought came from
Callahan, and it was Callahan, not Baim, who received the money
for the transaction. 20 Baim took the stand and testified that
although he was present at Carter's
house that day, he did not
21
anyone.
to
drugs
possess or sell
Baim was acquitted by the jury of the sale offense, but the
jury could not agree on either possession offense and the
22
Schenectady County Court accepted the partial verdict.
Subsequently, Baim initiated an Article 78 proceeding to prevent a
retrial on the possession charges.23
Baim's double jeopardy argument rested on Section
40.20(2) of New York's Criminal Procedure Law. 24 He argued
that all the charges were based upon the same criminal transaction
and therefore, Section 40.20(2) barred prosecution on the
25
possession offense once he was acquitted on the sale offense.
The Third Department dismissed this argument, holding that
Section 40.20(2) was satisfied when the People indicted Baim "in a
single accusatory instrument and tried [him] in one prosecution for
the sale 26and possession offenses based on the January 19, 1999
events."
The Third Department further held that New York's
Criminal Procedure Law Section 310.7027 authorizes a retrial after

'8 1d "
19 Id.

20 Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 787, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
2 Id. at 787-88, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
22

Id. at 788, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 719.

23

Id.

24

See supra note 9; Baim, 279 A.D.2d at 788, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
Baim, 279 A.D.2d at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.

2'

26
27

Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 310.70(2) (McKinney 2002) provides in pertinent

part:
Following the rendition of a partial verdict pursuant to

subdivision one, a defendant may be retried for any submitted
offense upon which the jury was unable to agree unless:
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a partial verdict on any offense upon which the jury could not
agree, but a subsequent guilty verdict in the retrial must not be
inconsistent with the verdict from the first trial. 28 The Third
Department was not convinced that a conviction on either
possession offense at a retrial would be inconsistent with the
acquittal on the sale offense, in violation of Section 310.70.29
Accordingly, the court did not agree with Baim's claim that "the
jury must have determined that he 'had not possessed the cocaine
recovered from [Costello],"' because of the acquittal of the
criminal sale charge.3 30
Consequently, a retrial would not produce
1
verdicts.
conflicting
The Third and Fourth Departments have upheld convictions
for both the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance and
criminal possession of a controlled substance reasoning that they
constitute "separate crimes. ,,32
In People v. Thomas,333 the
defendant was convicted of two counts of sale, and two counts of
possession of a controlled substance.34 On appeal to the Fourth
Department, the defendant asserted the argument that the
possession convictions should be dismissed "in the interest of
justice," as he considered them "non-inclusory concurrent counts
with the sale counts. 35 The Fourth Department upheld the
convictions, holding that the possession charges were not included
in the sale offenses. They were separate and distinct crimes.3 7
In People v. Freeman,38 the defendant on appeal also
sought to have a possession offense dismissed in the interest of
justice, contending that the same cocaine was the subject of both

(a) A verdict of conviction thereon would have been
inconsistent with a verdict, of either conviction or acquittal,
actually rendered with respect to some other offense.
28 Baim, 279 A.D.2d at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
29

id.

id.
Id.
32 Id. at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721 n.4.
13 174 A.D.2d 994, 572 N.Y.S.2d 156 (4th Dep't 1991).
34 id.
30
31

35
36

id.

id.

37 id.
38

176 A.D.2d 1090, 575 N.Y.S.2d 724 (3d Dep't 1991).
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his possession and sale charges. 39 The defendant further contended
that he would be Vunished twice for conduct which occurred in a
single transaction. The Third Department concurred with its own
precedent, as well as the judgment of the Fourth 'Department, and
held that the possession and sale counts constituted "separate
crimes.'
The Third Department relied on its earlier decision of In re
Green, v. County Court of Tompkins County.42 In Green, the
defendant was indicted on counts of manslaughter in the second
degree, criminally negligent homicide, and driving while
intoxicated.43 Defendant was acquitted of the manslaughter and
driving while intoxicated charges. However, the jury was unable
to reach an agreement as to the criminally negligent homicide
count and a mistrial was declared. 44 Defendant petitioned the
Appellate Division, Third Department, to prohibit prosecution on
the remaining charge, arguing that a retrial was barred by Criminal
Procedure Law Section 40.20 and that a new proceeding is
proscribed by Criminal Procedure Law Section 310.70. Defendant
argued that a conviction on the criminally negligent homicide
charge would be inconsistent with the acquittals for manslaughter
and driving while intoxicated. 5
After reviewing each of
defendant's arguments,
the
Third
Department
dismissed the
46
entirety.
its
in
petition
The Third Department reasoned in Green that because the
charge for criminally negligent homicide and manslaughter have
substantially different elements, an acquittal for the manslaughter
47
charge did not bar prosecution for criminally negligent homicide.
The key distinction against asserting double jeopardy was made by
Justice Kane in a concurring opinion.4 8 Justice Kane reasoned that
this case was not affected' by the constitutional violation of
'9 Id.

4 Id.
41id.

at 1092, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 726.

61 A.D.2d 1098,403 N.Y.S.2d 560 (3d Dep't 1978).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1098-99, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
45 Id.

42

46

Id.

47 Green, 61 A.D.2d at 1099, 403, N.Y.S.2d at 561.
48 Id. at 1100, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 562 (Kane, J.,
concurring).
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prosecuting twice for the same crime, because the new trial would
be a continuation of the original prosecution, which terminated
only because the jury was deadlocked.4 9 A criminal occurrence
may simultaneously violate several penal statutes and all charges
may all be joined in a single indictment and be brought to trial.5 0
Jeopardy did not attach when the jury was unable to agree on the
criminally negligent homicide charge. 5 Therefore, a "direction of
a new trial following a properly declared mistrial would not
52
constitute a second prosecution in the constitutional sense."
Turning to the instant case, jeopardy did not attach when the jury
was unable to reach a verdict on either of the possession offenses,
and therefore, Baim was not successful 53in prohibiting a retrial
based on the principle of double jeopardy.
Finally, in Baim the Third Department was not persuaded
by Baim's collateral estoppel argument.5 4 Citing the New York
Court of Appeals case of People v. Acevedo5 5 for authority, the
court opined that Baim did not meet his "heavy burden" of
showing that the acquittal of the sale offense at the first trial,
"necessarily decided a particular factual issue" to be decided in a
retrial. 56
In Acevedo, the defendant was charged in two
indictments with robbery and criminal possession of a weapon for
two separate incidents, both occurring at approximately the same
time. 57 Defendant sought to assert collateral estoppel to avoid relitigation of issues decided in his favor at a first trial. 58 The New
York Court of Appeals gave some guidance as to when the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is to be applied: "The rule is not to
be applied with a hypertechnical approach but with realism and
49

id.

'0 Id. at 1100-01, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
51 Id.

Green, 61 A.D.2d at 1101,403 N.Y.S.2d at 563.
3 Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
54 Id. at 790, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721. The doctrine of collateral estoppel,
or issue
preclusion, operates in a criminal prosecution to bar re-litigation of issues
necessarily resolved in defendant's favor at an earlier trial (People v. Goodman,
69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987)).
" 69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987).
56 Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 790, 718 N.Y.S.2d
at 721.
5
7 Acevedo 69 N.Y.2d at 480, 508 N.E.2d at 667, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
s Id. at 485, 508 N.E.2d at 669, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
52
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rationality by examining all parts of the record of the prior
proceeding and concluding from it whether a rational jury could
have grounded its decision on an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.' 59 In the instant
case, the Third Department reasoned that-when the jury reached an
acquittal on the sale offense it did not also im ?licitly determine
that Baim did not possess drugs on that d.ay. 0 Consequently,
collateral estoppel did not attach, barring a retrial of the possession
offenses. 6 1 The Third Department examined the record of the jury
trial, and determined that the jury could have based its decision to
acquit the defendant of the charges related t~o the alleged sale of
drugs on "an issue other than that which Baim seeks to foreclose
from consideration." 62 The acquittal, however, did not necessarily
lead to a63finding that Bairn did not possess drugs on the day in
question.

Baim was unable to persuade the Third Department that a
retrial on the two charges of possession of a. controlled substance
should be precluded on either double jeopardy or collateral
estoppel grounds. 64 The Third Department dismissed Baim's
petition because he did not show an absolute right to the remedy of
prohibition, and he failed to show that a conviction on either
possession offense would be inconsistent with the acquittal on the
sale offense.6 5 Lastly, Bairn was not able to successfully assert
collateral estoppel, because the acquittal of the sale offense did
not
66
necessarily decide a factual issue to be decided in a new trial.
Baim's contentions would most likely be given the same
treatment if analyzed by a federal court under federal law. Under
federal law, the concept of double jeopardy is enumerated in the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 67 However,
case law dealing with the prohibition against placing a defendant in
double jeopardy following a mistrial due to a. hung jury dates back
" Id. at 487, 508 N.E.2d at 671, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
60 Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 790, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 id.

64 Id.at 789-90, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
65 Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
66
67

Id. at 790, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
See supra note 7.
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to the 1824 United States Supreme Court decision of United States
v. Perez.68 In Perez, the defendant was on trial for a capital
offense, and the jury, unable to agree on a verdict, was discharged
by the court. 6 9 The issue then arose as to whether discharge of the
jury by the court acted as a bar to a future trial on the same
charge. 70 In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court held that a
failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of
"manifest necessity," which permitted a trial judge to retry the
defendant, 7 1because "the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated.",
Over the ensuing years, the Court has adhered to the rule
that a retrial following a "hung jury" does not violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.72 In Logan v. United
States, the defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy and
of murder during the prosecution of the conspiracy. 73 After the
jury was unable to agree on a verdict, the defendants filed a special
plea averring former jeopardy. 74 The Court held the plea of former
jeopardy "bad," as the Court found that it was within the trial
court's discretion to discharge the jury after they were unable to
agree as to these defendants. 75 The rationale for this rule was
stated by the Court in Arizona v. Washington:7 6 "[Without]
exception, the courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a
genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a
second trial. This rule accords recognition to society's interest in
giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those
who have violated its laws."77 In Arizona, the Court held that
when the jury is unable to reach a verdict, it has long been
considered a "classic basis for a proper mistrial. 78 The Court
further held that "the argument that a jury's inability to agree
6822 U.S. 579 (1824).
69 id.

70
71

id.
Id. at 580.

72

Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).

71

Id. at 281-82.
id. at 297.

74
7

1 Id.

76
78

78

at 298.
434 U.S. 497 (1978).
id. at.509.

id.
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establishes reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, and
therefore requires acquittal, has been uniformly rejected in this
country." 79

The United States Supreme Court has addressed double
jeopardy claims as recently as 1984, in Richardson v. United
States. In Richardson, the defendant was indicted in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia on "two counts of
distributing a controlled substance, and one count of conspiring to
distribute a controlled substance." 8'
The jwy acquitted the
defendant of one count of distributing a controlled substance, but
was unable to agree on the other two counts. 2 A mistrial was
83
declared as to the two remaining counts and a retrial was ordered.
Defendant then argued that a retrial was barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the Government
failed to produce convictions on the remaining counts at the first
trial. 84 The United States Supreme Court found the claim
unpersuasive, as the mistrial did not terminate the original jeopardy
on the two remaining counts, which is a necessary condition to the
assertion of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.85
The Supreme Court rejected Richardson's reliance on Burks v.
United States,86 for the contention that if the Government failed to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at his first trial, he
87
may not be tried again following a mistrial due to a hung jury.
The Court distinguished the facts of Richardson from Burks,
holding that Burks stood for the narrow rule that "if a defendant
obtained an unreversed appellate ruling that the Government had
failed to introduce sufficient evidence to convict him at trial, a
second trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause."88 The
Court was unwilling to depart from 160 years of case law, and
echoing the viewpoint of Perez, held that "a failure of the jury to
79id.

468 U.S. 317 (1984).
318.
82
id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Richardson. 468 U.S. at 318.
86 437 U.S. 1(1978).
87 Richardson, 468 U.S. at 322-23.
88 Id. at 323.
81 Id.at
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agree on a verdict was an instance of 'manifest necessity' which
permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the
defendant, because 'the ends of public justice would otherwise be
defeated.' 89 The Court cited its opinion in Wade v. Hunter,90
which aptly described the relationship between mistrials and
double jeopardy:
The double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment, however, does not mean that every
time a defendant is put to trial before a competent
tribunal he is entitled to go free if the trial fails to
end in a final judgment. Such a rule would create an
insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice
in many cases in which there is no semblance of the
type of oppressive practices at which the doublejeopardy prohibition is aimed.
There may be
unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial
making its completion impossible, such as the
failure of a jury to agree on a verdict. In such event
the purpose of law to protect society from those
guilty of crimes frequently would be frustrated by
denying courts power to put the defendant to trial
again. What has been said is enough to show that a
defendant's valued right to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal must in some instances be
subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials
designed to end in just judgments. 91
The federal and state courts appear to be in agreement as to
when a defendant can seek to bar a retrial on charges that were not
decided in an initial proceeding on double jeopardy grounds. In
New York, this protection is found in Section 40.20 of the
Criminal Procedure Law,92 and in the United States Constitution,
the notion is found in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 93 When a defendant is charged with more than one
offense stemming from the same transaction, courts generally will
89

Id. at 323-24 (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. at 580).

' 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
9'
92 id. at 688-89.
See supra note 9.
93 See supra note 7.
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not allow the assertion of double jeopardy to bar the prosecution of
one of the counts, as the offenses constitute "separate crimes. 94
However, a subsequent guilty verdict in the retrial must not be
inconsistent with the verdict from the first trial. 95 Furthermore,
when a jury is unable to agree upon a verdict, the effect of a court
declaring a mistrial is not a bar to the prosecution of those offenses
at some future time, and as such, not a violation of double jeopardy
on either the state or federal level.96

Evan M. Zuckerman

Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 789, n.4, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721 n.4.
Id. at 789, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
96 See, e.g., Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324; Bairn, 279 A.D.2d at 787,
718
N.Y.S.2d at 719.
94
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